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The class of economies that depends on oil exports is of 
great professional interest to the economist, because its 
development takes an analysable and (in principle) predictable
form, and also is inherently dramatic - involving, in fact, 
hubris, the essence of classical drama.
The historic challenge to an oil producer can be put quite 
simply - to create a viable socio-economi^ structure before
means to do this. The gap between the retail price of oil 
and the cost of production is so large that although governments 
of consumer countries tax away much of this TrentT; and enormous 
profits are made by companies that extract, refine and market 
the oil; much is still left for the producing countries. 
Moreover, the great majority of these financial resources are 
directly at the disposal of the government itself, and the 
development of an oil economy is therefore much more subject 
to the influence of government policy than is the development 
of any other type of economy. Yet all governments of oil- 
producing countries find great difficulty in creating a viable 
socio-economic structure in time. I shall discuss the roots of 
these difficulties here, and the limitations of conventional 
economics in analysing the problems of an economy of this type.
Trends in the world price
There are exporters1 associations for a number of minerals, but 
OPEC has been uniquely successful in raising export prices far 
above marginal costs, especially costs in the Middle East.
It has been able to do this essentially because the demand for 
oil is especially inelastic.
The reasons for this inelasticity are:-
(a) Oil provides inputs into many of the goods and services
that an advanced civilisation could not easily do without
oil revenue declines.
(making possible human mobility and temperature control, 
as well as supplying the feedstock for fertilisers, 
plastics and many other chemical products);
(b) For many of these uses (especially motoring and aviation), 
substitutes would be expensive and inconvenient.
The world demand and short-term supply curves for oil look 
very roughly like this:
(Diagram I h.r.)  ^ ^  ^  ^
The price would be in short-term equilibrium at B if fth ere were 
perfect competition. But the total income of producers 
(governments and companies) can be maximised at a price of about 
A. This is what the price might be if there were a worldwide 
production monopoly (though the encouragement that a high price 
gives to oil exploration and to research on non-traditional 
forms of energy - and perhaps the possibility of a political r e ­
action - might make the monopolist settle for something rather 
lower).^ Exactly where the world price lies between these limits - 
say between $2 a barrel and $20 - is not determined by economic 
factors (though these do "fe^he shape of the curves and the 
positions of the limits ), but by the bargaining strengths of 
companies and producing and consuming governments. What helps 
the producing governments is that oil reserves are relatively 
concentrated geographically, only about a dozen countries 
accounting for the great bulk of world trade, and within that 
dozen a handful (including the biggest) belonging to one political 
region.
Economic theory as such - i.e. if abstracted from political 
factors - is therefore of limited help in explaining a main 
determinant of the economic growth of oil-producing countries, 
the price of its leading export.
(Diagram II here)
After stability for some decades (even a decline at the ene of the 
1950s^\ the dollar price of oil doubled between 1970 and 1973
(£) The terms of trade of Iran deteriorated more than 40 per cent 
between 1956 and 1962 (nIran!s Terms of TradeM, Ministry of 
Finance, 1966). Other producers had similar experiences and 
this stimulated the creation of OPEC in 1960.
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and trebled in 1974, because of the favourable political 
conjuncture for producers. It has, however, only risen slowly 
recently, more slowly than the dollar prices of manufactures, 
in part because of the recession, in part because some governments 
do not find it convenient to exercise their full bargaining power.
So its purchasing power (or ’real price1) has slipped back a 
little. It may not resume its rise for a few years now, because 
of the coincidence of the slow economic recovery in the main oil­
consuming countries with the growing flow of non-OPEC oil from 
Alaska and the North Sea, soon to be followed by the new Mexican 
fields.
But during the 1980s, the whole supply curve could start to move 
upwards (in real terms), as some of the most accessible reserves 
begin to be exhausted. The oil surplus of the COMECON group, 
now apparently declining, may well have disappeared, even turned 
into a deficit. Better conditions will have been created for a 
renewed rise in the real price, especially if governments in the 
industrial countries find unemployment politically threatening 
and stimulate economic growth. There will be increasing pressure 
from those oil exporters facing foreign exchange difficulties 
because output has levelled off or is falling (see below), or because 
oil capacity is limited in relation to their population.
(Many of these /already face renewed foreign—exrehangc d-iTifixral-tTe^ ).
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The timing, speed and extent of this future upsurge in prices 
depends mainly on the cohesion of OPEC, but it could be quite 
sharp in the meantime nuclear power and other new sources 
of energy have been developed on a big scale in the leading
industrial countries or their energy consumption curtailed. (It 
could also of course be triggered off by another war in the Middle 
East, or internal difficulties in any major producer.)
Trends in a governments share
The second determinant of a government’s resources, and therefore 
of national economic growth, is the proportion of the export value
it t a k e s w h e t h e r  in royalties, rents, taxes or profits of 
its oil corporations. Here again the forces at work are 
fundamentally political, and therefore not easily handled with 
the tools of conventional economic analysis.
This proportion moves along a path approximately as in Diagram III. 
(Diagram III here)
The government share is typically low at first. Being inexperienced^ 
it is ignorant of its strength (even perhaps of the extent of 
its mineral resources) and is satisfied with any arrangement 
that makes a significant addition to revenues. It does not 
consider how much it can squeeze out of foreign companies, still 
less whether it could extract the oil itself. The administration 
of taxes, which it relies on as the main instrument, is carried 
out without much expertise on what items and what prices are 
legitimate costs of production. Moreover, generous depreciation 
(and even depletion) allowances often permit the companies 
early recovery of exploration and development expenses.
But there is a learning process. Tax rates rise in due course, 
perhaps stimulated by the example of other countries; tax 
administration is tightened; and national oil companies are 
established (such as PETROVEN in Venezuela, SONATREC in Algeria,
BNOC in Britain). These at first get preference in licensing 
(or sole exploration rights), then take over production, as Mfe 
technological capacity grows. Different oil producers are at 
different points on this curve, depending on the time they have 
been in production and their- political and technical capacity.
(1) Strictly the contribution to national income includes also 
costs of production incurred in the country (e.g. local 
salaries and wages, purchases of materials locally produced 
and local costs of refining). These are, however, usually 
of rather minor importance, because employment in oil is low an< 
oil extraction runs well ahead of local capacity in oil- 
related industries. (Even in Britain, despite the activities 
of the Offshore Supplies Office, only about two-thirds of the 
inputs of oil development have been bought locally - less in 
the early years. See annual reports of the Offshore Supplies 
Office, Seriatim )•
;
Trends in national output
Any national pool of oil is of course finite. It is true that 
a country’s effective reserves depend on techniques of extraction 
and conservation, and on the price of oil, but the physical 
limits are still there. So the course of a country’s oil 
production, from the viewpoint of an historian of the future, 
takes the general shape of Diagram IV (the actual curve in a 
given country being determined by the timing of exploration and 
by depletion policy). After a slow gestation period, the youthful 
phase begins with output rising sharply. Then the oil economy 
enters a phase of maturity, with output running at a plateau 
for some years, perhaps sustained by new discoveries. Finally 
senility starts to set in: output declines and dwindles to 
virtually nothing. The volume of recoverable oil is the area 
under the curve. This limits the possible depletion paths: 
extraction can be prolonged by avoiding a high peak, but it 
must peter out in what is by historical standards a very short 
time. The whole brief incident looks like being virtually all 
over in less than a century in all of today’s producers (except 
perhaps Saudi Arabia).
(Diagram IV here)
Different countries are at different phases of the production
cycle. Iran is in its phase of maturity, unlikely to exceed
by much its recent levels of 6k million barrels a day. Venezuela,
Bahrein and Kuwait (like Romania) have already passed their
peak o u t p u t w h i c h  they are unlikely to reach again (though
in Venezuela - by contrast to the others - there are still
possibilities of major finds). They are on the right hand side
of Diagram IV, passing through their ’middle age’. For these
countries in particular, the price rises in 1973-74 (and increases
in the government share in the price) were very important,
because they enabled revenues to continue climbing even though
(2)output had levelled off or fallen . They provided a sort of 
rejuvenation.
(1) The Venezuelan output in 1970 was more than 3.7 million
barrels a day compared to 2.4 in 1976.
(2) They were also very important for countries like Indonesia 
with relatively large populations in relation to oil output 
and therefore not easily covering import needs.
An economist would say that the optimal rate of 
depletion of the stock of oil, from a long-term national 
point of view, should depend principally on expectations about 
world price, and on time-discount rates which allow for the 
short-term need for foreign exchange, reflecting in turn the 
feasible pace of investment.
But there are strong non-economic pressures on governments to 
produce at rates much higher than economically optimal, indeed 
not to have a depletion policy at all. The euphoria as revenue 
rises is such that it is difficult to resist claims for higher 
salaries and wages, especially those made by employees of the 
government itself. These spread to other sectors (though only 
to some parts of agriculture), and fast increases in demand for 
consumer goods are induced. In consequence, a large proportion 
of the imports of oil exporters (more than two-thirds in the case 
of Iran and Venezuela) does not consist of capital goods at all, 
or even of consumer necessities, and governments find they need
exports not to finance development projects but to cover
. (1 ) consumer luxuries
Moreover, many oil producers export much more than they need to 
finance the flood of imports. They are pressed to do so by 
oil companies, anxious to recover exploration and development 
costs, and by foreign governments, on behalf of their oil 
consumers. Overseas financial assets are therefore accumulated 
- first cash reserves (over and above what are necessary), then a 
miscellaneous collection of foreign government bonds, equity shares 
real estate, etc. The yields on these may not match the long-run 
rise in the value of oil kept in the ground, yet overseas 
investments could, it is true, reinforce the bargaining position 
of an oil producer (even more of oil producers collectively), if 
participation were judiciously bought in the producing companies,
(1) A scathing attack on "the physical and moral degradation 
of the public" in Venezuela due to increases in pay after 
the 1973-4 price rise was made in 1976 by none other than 
Sr. Perez Alfonso, the "Father of OPEC" (Resumen 25.1.76).
He also described the plan for national development as a 
"plan for national destruction".
or ’downstream’ and marketing facilities purchased, or 
investments made in alternative sources of energy - as presumably 
our hypothetical world oil monopoly would d o ^ \
Conservation policy may also be neglected.
In the phase of youthful euphoria, there is little attempt to 
monitor production - for example, companies may be allowed to 
locate their wells in patterns that reflect short-term 
profitability rather than long-term national needs, or to 
flare associated gas indiscriminately. However, supervision grad­
ually improves as experience is gained and personnel trained. 
Trends in revenues
The time pattern of revenues for any particular country is 
determined by the conjunction of the factors mentioned above - 
i.e. by superimposing the general trend in the world price 
(Diagram II) and in the particular government’s take (Diagram 
III) on the particular path of national depletion (Diagram IV).
The effect of trends in prices and taxes in the 1970s has been 
to prolong the period when revenue is at its peak or to mitigate 
its decline. But eventually the curve in Diagram IV takes 
charge - there is a limit (of 100 per cent) to the proportion 
the government can take and anyway as output declines, this 
proportion and the price become increasingly irrelevant.
The use of revenues
The size of revenues from oil means that governments which 
export it can invest heavily without suffering the typical 
foreign exchange crises and inflationary pressures of ’under­
developed’ countries which attempt to force the pace of economic
(1) It could alternatively be used to build a viable and
integrated regional economy by aid to neighbouring states. 
The coming rise in oil prices will create great economic 
problems for countries which lack both oil and the capital 
to develop alternative sources of energy or additional 
export industries.
growth. Growth rates of 6 to 8 per cent are typical for some 
decades, especially where^oil reserves are large in relation 
to population. But tko&e- -aye 'not very relevant - indeed income 
is carried to heights whichmay not be sustained. The test is 
whether they can diversify their production and their exports. 
There is no economic reason why they should not do this - and 
abolish poverty and unemployment, enabling them to create 
genuine democracies, socially integrated and politically as 
stable as Sweden or Switzerland, strong enough to survive the 
exhaustion of oil. Indeed diversification is usually the official 
long-term strategy, summed up in the Venezuelan adage sembrar el 
petroleo :nLet us sow the petroleum".
It is clear, however, that the traditional oil exporters are 
not achieving this metamorphosis. In Iran, oil still accounted 
for 89 per cent of exports in 1970, and in Venezuela 91 per cent, 
despite the decline in the real price in the previous 15 years 
(These ratios are of course still higher now.) In both countries, 
oil still provided in 1970 more than 50 per cent of revenue.
In both of them, manufacturing had remained fairly constant as 
a proportion of national income, and agriculture had sharply 
declined, the big expansion being in services. (Typically, the 
bureaucracy of a petroleum economy is swollen far beyond that 
of its neighbours.)
Indeed, some oil exporters seem already to have lost their 
historic opportunity. (I cannot speak about Britain or Nigeria, 
partly because they are, especially Britain, still too young 
for the pattern of their life cycles to be clear.) This is not 
hard to explain. It is difficult in oil exporting countries for 
either industry or agriculture to produce import substitutes 
(still harder, to produce exports) at prices anywhere near world 
market levels.
(1) Nezhat Sedaghat "Development Policies of Iran and Venezuela
(1950 to the early 1970s), a comparison of the industrialisation 
and diversification attempts" (M.Phil. dissertation, Sussex, 
1977).
Diversification is hampered by:
(i) An overvalued exchange rate, due to the chronic export 
surplus;
(ii) High salaries and wages, stimulated by the example of the 
government and the oil corporations (public or private).
So local industries need heavy protection, demonstrating their 
inability to compete in world markets (and therefore their 
limited contribution to the long-term strategic needs).
But again, parts of the explanation are non-economic. Savings 
accumulate in the hands of the government, which is organised 
and accustomed to administer public works and housing projects 
(e.g. the expressways and Tsuperbloques1 of Venezuela), not to 
establish new industries.
Perhaps the main reason why the declared socio-economic 
objectives of oil-producing governments are not met, however, 
lies in what oil does to the perceptions of the decisionmakers 
themselves. It seems to offer a complete solution to economic 
problems. Those with political power tend to forget that oil 
revenues will inevitably decline in due course, and aim simply 
to achieve temporary prosperity. As pointed out above, when 
oil revenues soar (especially in periods when prices, government 
take and output are all rising simultaneously), euphoria sweeps 
through an oil-producing country, leading to a dissipation of 
export earnings in personal consumption. Moreover, checks on 
government expenditure become less strict. Big glamorous projects 
are readily adopted. A great deal is spent on military 
equipment, especially the latest aeroplanes, which are easier 
to justify in terms of technophilia than of strict military 
necessity.
Indeed, one characteristic of oil-exporting economies is that the 
hotels in their capitals are full of businessmen in search of 
contracts or licences to invest - even more so that in other 
dependent countries. Because of the many pressures om the
government to spend the mounting revenues, there is not time to 
base industrial policy on a phased programme of industrialisation, 
keeping pace with technological research capacity, still less on 
a careful assessment of what techniques of industrial production 
various countries have to offer at what prices (the traditional 
Japanese procedure). So policy consists of a series of ad hoc 
reactions to the proposals put by whichever businessmen happen 
to be in the country. These proposals may have little relation 
to long-term economic and social needs. They may, for example, 
lead to factories being sited in or near the main cities, 
increasing the economic and social gap between town and country 
and stimulating internal migration until it becomes socially 
damaging (and economically costly). Contracts are so profitable 
that extra-official recompense can become endemic, affecting 
the allocation of resources.
Development projects may provide little actual employment.
The combination, referred to above, of relatively high 
w a g e s , an overvalued exchange r a t e , together with a shortage 
of skilled workers and supervisors, and possible 'incentives’ 
such as accelerated amortisation and cheap credit, may, allowing 
for the typical urge to spend revenues somehow, encourage the 
use of capital-intensive techniques of both construction and 
operation. Morevoer, employment in the oil industry itself 
is negligible, from its very nature, and actually declines
(with the slowing up of/development) long before output
itself starts to fall. In many countries, especially the 
smaller ones, the jobs that are created go mainly to foreigners - 
the higher level ones,because of shortage of skills, unskilled 
jobs because of the reluctance of the local population to do
i i w (1)manual labour
So while this upsurge of public and private spending creates a 
fast rate of economic growth, it is unlikely to yield sufficient 
increases in employment to match the rising labour force, 
especially that of the urban areas (augmented by migration from 
the countryside). Thus in Trinidad, --------------------------- ^
(l) See "Migration and the Labour Force in the Oil Producing 
States of the Middle East", by Fred Halliday, PGvelopment 
and Change, Vol. 8, No. 3i July 1977*
the one petroleum economy with good, regular and frequent 
labour force surveys, open unemployment has risen to more than 10 pe 
cent (despite an economic growth rate of over 5 per cent for three 
cades). Open unemployment excludes, of course, those who do not 
look for work because they have little hope or inclination - 
and all those in makework jobs, whether in the government or 
the private sector.
Moreover, because there appears in the short term to be no
foreign exchange problem and therefore no need for industrialisation
criteria and because haste precludes proper planning , a
productive structure is created which is highly dependent on
cheap energy and imports of equipment, intermediate products
and technology, and therefore will only be sustained with great
difficulty when oil exports start to decline. Similarly, the
life-styles of consumers become adjusted to imports of goods
which cannot be produced locally (wheat, for example). Even
the layout of cities - which will last for centuries - may
reflect the temporary cheapness and availability of petrol^ \
The rural areas do benefit to some extent from the fast economic 
growth. They usually get injections of purchasing power, 
sometimes through the devolution of revenues to regional and 
local authorities, and cash remittances from relatives in the 
cities or the oilfields. Purchases of some locally-produced 
foods rise. But on the whole, the pattern is one of increasing 
concentration of income, both geographically and socially.
In both Iran and - - - n
(1) The government of a petroleum exporter usually allows
petrol to be sold to local consumers at prices well below 
what they would have to pay elsewhere (or, from another 
point of view, its long-term social cost). The result is 
not even increased mobility. The combination of a low petrol 
price with uncontrolled imports (or local assembly) of 
cars, and fast rising personal incomes, can mean simply 
traffic growing on a scale that outruns local road capacity, 
even although this is increased rapidly. Traffic in capitals 
of oil exporters moves as slowly as in any city of the world.
Venezuela in 1971, the lowest 10 per cent of income receivers 
got only 1.2 per cent of personal income, whereas the top 10 
per cent received 47 per cent and 41 per cent respectively - 
nearly 40 times as much. This concentration is indeed visible 
to the most casual observer in the form of large and growing 
disparities in housing, clothing, means of transport etc.
The bulk of social expenditure typically flows into urban areas 
and to the particular advantage of the salaried personnel and 
wage earners in government, petroleum and modern manufacturing 
- for example by the provision of hospitals, universities, 
urban motorways* etc. Usually only a small fraction of public 
revenue is devoted to social security benefits (except in tiny 
producers, such as Kuwait or Abu Dhabi, and even there most of 
the benefits are confined to citizens, who form less than half 
the population).
On the other hand, direct taxes, such as income tax, remain 
low, by international standards - in part because the size of 
oil revenues obscures the need for revenue from other sources.
Some countries (e.g. Algeria and Libya) have tried to limit 
inequality by imposing ceilings on salary levels. However, 
this is hard to implement, especially in the oil industry: 
those in senior positions are in an international market, 
subject to offers from international oil companies.
Finally, even inflation may not be avoided, despite the supply 
flexibility provided by massive imports. The unlikelihood of 
resistance to salary and wage demands has been mentioned.
In addition, the demand for imports may outrun even their 
rising volume, because of limits in physical capacity, e.g. 
transportation.
Institutional aspects
The economic and political power offered by the revenues makes 
political power attractive, with whatever degree of repression 
seems necessary. This may delay the learning process and length
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the period of inappropriate deals. When, as inevitably, oil 
exports level off, decline and come to an end, immense strains 
will be imposed on the political and social structures of 
countries where consumption styles and production systems have been 
based on high oil revenues.
The impact may be cushioned by income from assets abroad (and 
their sale), and by rising output in whatever alternative dynamic 
sectors have been created. The rise in unemployment may be 
mitigated by the departure of migrant workers (those who stay may 
constitute a severe social problem in a declining economy.
But taxes will
inevitably rise sharply (especially on domestic uses of oil), 
large numbers of civil servants may well be dismissed and 
military equipment sold off. Just as the public sector is 
the main beneficiary of the boom, so it will bear the brunt of 
the slump. Then the typical euphoria of adolescence will give 
way to the equally typical remorse of the aged over opportunity 
foregone, and political tensions may mean even greater author­
itarianism.
Decisionmakers in Venezuela are perhaps the most conscious of 
the drama that.lies ahead if they are unable to create viable 
alternative industries in time; and they are fortunate in being 
endowed with good natural resources of other kinds. Their strategy 
is to induce a rebirth of the economy by basing steel and 
engineering industries on the iron ore and hydro-electric 
resources of Oriente province. Part of the big increase in 
oil revenues since 1973 has been earmarked for this purpose and 
put in a special fund (the fondo de inversiones ). But the 
world markets for the products of heavy industries are highly 
competitive and it remains to be seen whether it will be 
possible to support indefinitely the numbers and consumption 
standards of the large Venezuelan bureaucracy and professional 
class by these means.
Bahrein is following a different strategy:s
it is establishing a role as a centre for services (especially 
finance) in the Middle East. Tne Teas ibili t.y of such a role has 
been increased by the political troubles in the Middle East’s 
traditional, banking centre, Lebanon. But this is a possibility 
open on 1 y to very few, verv small. nrnrlurorc .
Britain faces a somewhat similar problem^ \  North Sea oil 
is already bringing to the government a welcome relief from 
the politico-economic crisis of the mid 1970s. But, if the 
revenues are used to increase consumption in general (e.g. 
by tax reliefs), rather than to finance much more difficult 
tasks of restructuring the economy and easing social problems, 
this country will also face severe withdrawal symptoms when 
oil revenue starts to decline, despite the range of other 
industries already in existence. The crisis will probably come 
before the end of the century if the government succumbs to the 
pressures and temptations to permit large net oil exports.
Oil is therefore not by any means the blessing it appears to 
be. It provides great opportunities, but the very nature of 
the industry also makes these almost impossible to grasp and in­
duces growing structural strains. A particular property of oil 
is that it casts a smokescreen over a countryTs real problems. 
Symptoms such as foreign exchange problems and fiscal 
inadequacies are temporarily concealed.
*  ~k -k  -k
Economics textbooks produced in Europe or North America (or 
for that matter in communist countries) make little reference 
to the factors mentioned above. This reflects inter alia 
the lack of professional interest in taxonomy, the classification 
of economies for analytical purposes. This, in turn reflects the
concentration of the profession in one type of country - the
• J (2) industrial exporters. y
(it also reflects an attempt to isolate economic
factors from their socio-political context. Texts that fail to
differentiate between types of economy - and to allow where needbe
for non-economic factors - are of limited use in preparing the
economists of the coming generation for their main role of
analysing what choices of strategy are open. This
(1) See "North Sea-Oil: The Application of Development Theories"
(M. Phil. Faculty and Students, IDS Communication, 121, 1977)
(2) As is implied above, one also needs to differentiate within
the oil-exporting group, especially between those with large
and small populations in relation to output.^ The dividing
line woulf be half a barrel per day De
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is particularly the case for oil-producing countries, 
where economics can make an important, though limited, contribution 
Yet even in Britain, where oil has been flowing for some years, and 
expected for maiy,very few Universities offer lectures on oil 
economics, still fewer on the Comparative Political Economy of 
Oil, drawing on the experience of countries facing formally 
similar problems. It is possible in fact for an economics 
student in Britain to go through a course lasting three years 
without ever hearing the word ToilT^ \  Despite the powerful 
urge in oil exporting countries, as elsewhere, to emulate 
overseas syllabuses, their main need is not sophisticated 
macro-economic models, but models specifically designed to 
show inter-sectoral and national/foreign linkages, with 
allowance for various factors that cannot be accommodated in 
purely economic models. So a great responsibility lies with 
national professions to develop their subject in a relevant 
way and illuminate the actual development options open.(2)
In the case of the petroleum economy, it is our responsibility 
to show the conditions for surviving death as a petroleum 




(1) He may also hear little about the implications of country 
size or location.
This may be made much easier or much more difficult by the 
statistics available. Many official statistical offices in 
oil-exporting countries pay little attention to the operations 
of the petroleum industry. This applies especially to the 
system of national accounts. The Banco Central of Venezuela 
has prepared for many years _a framework of n a tional accounts 
nr i a  scpar ate account for th e o i 1 Indus try J in t e gr a t e d 
with the others, showing how oil-generated incomes flow 
economy. This makes possible simulations of different
assumptions about oil prices and production, essential steps 
economists who are either planners or teachers. I believe, 
















OX L . TYPICAL PATH OF GOVERNMENT TAKE
DIAGRAM TV 
OTL: TYPICAL PATH OF PRODUCTION
